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What does that mean precisely? In general it seems to mean changes in the filibuster which would be fundamentally game-changing in terms of the function of the Senate and majority rule while still leaving a thing called the ‘filibuster’ which is a significant part of Senate function. Specifically, the possible reforms fall into two basic categories. But before we get to that we need to discuss what is so destructive about the current filibuster: It is an absolute veto on any legislation (aside from reconciliation budget bills) which can’t command 60 votes. Critically, it requires zero effort on the blocking party’s part. Usually it’s just a matter of a heads up to the Majority Leader – hey, we won’t let you hold this vote. And it’s basically invisible.
The whole reason the relief bill is going through the reconciliation process is because minority Republicans are filibustering it. But wait? No one has reported their filibustering it and we haven’t seen anyone do anything. Are you sure about this, Josh? Yes, absolutely. It’s a filibuster because McConnell let Schumer know (what at this point is a given) that the Republican caucus won’t let the bill come to a vote. It’s absolute, easy and invisible. Each of those components are part of the problem.
Now the two possible paths of reform I mentioned. One approach is to place some limit on the filibuster. Maybe you prevent a bill from coming to the floor but after a month the majority can end it with a majority vote. Or maybe three months. Or maybe it’s not a time limit precisely but a series of events that have to happen. The point is there’s a limit. It’s not just no and that’s the end.
There’s actually some value to such a process and a vestigial version of it persists in many legislatures that require multiple ‘readings’ of a bill. Indeed, there’s some utility in the creating a power for the majority to slow down the legislative process on some big game-changing bill. But slowing it down for a period isn’t the same as an unconstrained veto.. That’s one approach.
Another approach is to make the minority work for it. Under the current rules the minority literally doesn’t have to do anything. It’s the majority that needs to get 60 votes and bring them all to the floor for a vote. The minority party literally doesn’t even need to show up. People rhapsodize about bringing back the ‘talking filibuster’ – which is as much as anything a Hollywood creation. But simply shifting who has to do something would make a big difference.
For instance, what if instead of what I described above, the Majority Leader could bring a bill to a vote and to block it the minority would have to get forty votes on the floor to say no. You could mix that with some requirement to stay on the floor to keep it up. I guarantee you that would get old for the minority party really quick. That is not only hard to do – have everyone available at a moment’s notice – it’s visible. If Democrats were trying to get a vote on the minimum wage under this system you’d have repeated instances of the Democrats starting to hold a vote only to have 40 Republicans show up and say no we won’t let you hold a vote. That’s a bad look. And it’s central to the modern filibuster that it’s function doesn’t ‘look’ like anything. Because, as I said, it’s invisible.
How long would they keep it up?
We don’t entirely have to speculate.
This is what prompted me to discuss this today. The conciliation process actually has what amounts to a talking filibuster embedded within it – at least to a degree. And it just started this morning. It’s generally called the “vote-o-rama”. Basically there is an unlimited opportunity to offer amendments, all of which have to be voted on. It’s unlimited. So Republicans can basically just keep offering amendments indefinitely. But they don’t. That never, ever happens. Never. They get tired of it. They won’t to go to dinner. They want to go to the beach. They need to go to a fundraiser. They want to go home and go to sleep. No less important, after a certain number of days they would start to seem ridiculous.
One Senate veteran tells me that it’s not quite the same because at a certain point the chair can say the amendments have become ‘dilatory’, basically an obvious and excessive delaying tactic. It then goes to the parliamentarian for a ruling. But as we’ve just seen a majority can overrule the parliamentarian. At the end of the day, if 51 votes say it’s dilatory it’s dilatory and that’s the end. But there’s little question that the process could be delayed much, much longer than it normally is before that cudgel came into play.
This tells me pretty clearly – I mean, we have a clear test case – that if the filibuster required an on-going concrete action from the GOP it wouldn’t go on very long at all. As indeed, this vote-o-rama won’t go on for that long. Annoying, a spectacle, a time to make the majority wait. But it won’t go on that long.
I raise all this because if there’s a positive end game to all this battle for majority rule in Congress it’s ‘reform’ that allows folks like Manchin and Schumer to say they didn’t ‘abolish’ the filibuster. They saved the filibuster for future generations! By reforming it and taking away the incentives to get rid of it. But such reforms would likely make all the difference in the world for the reasons I note here.